

Angels Falling on Earth: Empirical Evidence on the Equity Gap Closed by Informal Venture Financing from a Worldwide Deal-Making

Francesco Baldi¹
Department of Management
University of Turin
Email: francesco.baldi@unito.it

Cristina Rovera
Department of Management
University of Turin
Email: cristina.rovera@unito.it

¹ Corresponding author.

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1. Introduction

Business angels are informal investors who finance newly-established, small-sized firms using their own private savings with the aim of acquiring related minority equity stakes (10-30%) through the provision of equity capital (Mason and Harrison, 2015).² Angels are typically high-net worth individuals having no family ties or connections with the entrepreneurs whose new ventures are targeted by the formers' form of financing. Hence, angels do not provide what is known as "love money" granted by the relatives or friends of entrepreneurs. Angel financing represents early-stage "informal venture financing", a complementary source of equity funding compared to that provided by formal intermediaries, such as venture capitalists (VCs), at later stages of a newly-established firm's life-cycle.

Business angels provide target firms both with equity capital and their personal expertise on how to conduct business operations and to grow in a specific sector. Angels' primary goal is to obtain a capital gain from the sale of the acquired shares, but also non-pecuniary benefits, which is related to their nature of informal investors.

Business angel financing to early-stage entrepreneurial ventures is a world-wide phenomenon, spanning various geographical areas (Europe, USA, Asia), that increasingly contributes to the growth of the real economy. The size of the angel market in Europe increased to € 7.3 billion in 2017, a growth of 9% from 2016 (EBAN, 2017). In 2017, the business angel community in Europe grew to 337.500 investors, which closed 39,990 deals. The main sector of investment in 2017 was FinTech and ICT, followed by pharmaceutical/healthcare and media. UK is the leading country with € 107,7 million invested in 2017 (vs. € 98 million in 2016). Germany's and France's angel investment markets were worth € 77 million and € 63 million respectively.

Based on a recent survey on 1,659 business angels active in US (The American Angel Survey, Angel Capital Association - ACA, USA; 2018), it has been estimated that angel investment activity is worth \$ 24 billion each year, contributing to the growth and success of more than 64,000 start-up firms. In the US economy, in 2017 432 investment rounds in 393 companies were made by 26 angel groups amounting to \$ 102 million (Angel Funders Report, Angel Capital Association - ACA, USA; 2018). The 393 ventures received a total of \$ 534 million via syndication with other angel groups, individual angels and VC firms. Entrepreneurial firms those angel groups invested in were located in 36 US states. Nearly 60% of the total investment rounds were worth \$ 1 million or less, with a median size of \$ 1 million. More than two-thirds of the deals were conducted in the technology and life sciences sectors.

Angels invest into equity as well debt instruments. Because they provide their own funds, they have no fiduciary responsibility and they are not regulated (in US, they must comply with the Security and Exchange Commission's rules only in phase of accreditation³, which is not binding for executing their activity).

² The term *angel* was used in the early 20th century among Broadway insiders, hence in the theater context, to describe spectators-investors with a very high-risk profile, who made huge investments in theater productions with the purpose of having the privilege of being familiar with artist they admired. The, the same term was attributed to those investors operating in the business context, becoming significant only in the years '50 and '60, when lots of pioneering started to finance early stage companies in the Silicon Valley, representing the first source of funds of the latter.

³ Definition of accredited investor by SEC, Title 17, Commodity and Securities Exchanges, part 230, 5001:

- any natural person who had an individual income in excess of \$200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that person's spouse in excess of \$300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year;
- any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, exceeds \$1,000,000.

Despite their traditional rule of *active* investors, past research has shown that business angels often adopt *passive* strategies. A passive angel is a provider of capital with no involvement in the development of the target firm. A study by Benjamin and Margulis (2000) shows that 35% of interviewed business angels were involved in an early stage investment without being aware about the related business plan. For active angel investors, there are two ways to keep their interests aligned with those of the management team or entrepreneur: performance incentives and direct control. Performance incentives include the use of management employment contracts, managerial stock ownership, etc; direct control is the allocation of voting rights which allows active angels to also active in the Board of Directors (Prowse, 1998).

Due to their low visibility as individual investors, since the early 1990s business angels have started gathering in formal associations organized on a territorial or industrial basis. Such organizations are generally called Business Angels Network (BAN) (e.g., ACA in USA, EBAN in Europe, IBAN in Italy) and have the purpose of matching entrepreneurs with BAs.

Despite their crucial importance for the development of a new venture, business angels only represent a marginal segment of entrepreneurial finance, compared to venture capital (Croce, Tenca and Ughetto, 2017). Business angels are thus required to fill the equity gap which arises from new ventures' need for funds in addition to "love money". Indeed, new or serial entrepreneurs search for finance to aid their ventures to grow, being often too small in size for reaching the threshold of a VC investment (Sohl, 2003).

In this context, our study aims to make a key contribution to the extant literature providing unique empirical evidence at worldwide level on the main characteristics of business angel equity financing and associated deal-making compared to those of VCs.

This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 formulates the hypotheses grounded in the prior literature on informal venture financing, Section 3 provides a review of literature on business angel financing. Section 4 illustrates the dataset, describes the empirical analysis and discusses the related findings. Section 5 concludes by providing implications for researchers, managers and policy-makers.

2. Hypotheses' Development

Early stage entrepreneurial firms typically require a small amount of equity injection, given the primitive nature of the business which may still need to develop a prototypical product or service, an initial distribution network or a base of customers. As the life-cycle of the venture proceeds and the business becomes more mature with lower operational/financial risks, "informal venture financing" is increasingly replaced by VC-based equity financing (Wetzel and Wilson, 1985; Berger and Udell, 1998). Based on the above, we posit that:

H1: Business angels are less likely to participate in venture financing as the size of the deal increases.

Informal venture financing plays a crucial role in mitigating the two main risks associated with an entrepreneur's decision to quit its business, the lack of motivation and capital (Aydin, 2015), that typically occur at early stages. Business angels invest 16 times as often in seed ventures than do venture capitalists, as VCs are mostly attracted by the lower risk of later business development stages (Capizzi, 2015). This is confirmed by empirical evidence at regional level. For example, European business angels tend to primarily invest into firms at seed stage, with 30% of them providing equity funds to ventures at start-up phase and only a small fraction selecting late-stage companies as their investment targets (EBAN, 2017). In the US market, the proportion of angel financing to early stage firms has increased from 31% in 2016 to 41% in 2017. However, business angels also show investment preferences for entrepreneurial ventures operating in the expansion phase (Sohl, 2018). We therefore posit:

H2: Business angels are more likely to provide equity capital to firms at the early-stages of their life-cycle (seed or start-up phase) rather than at the expansion stage.

Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as “a contract under which the principal engages the agent to perform some service on his behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”. As utility maximizers, both agent and principal act in their best interest. In this sense, the principal needs to (a) incur monitoring costs to limit the misuse of capital by the agent, (b) pay the so-called bounding costs (for instance, when stipulating contracts) to compensate the agent for her good conduct, (c) exercise voting rights in board or shareholders’ meetings (when the principal is an investor). Agency costs can be defined as the sum of monitoring costs, bounding costs and a residual loss, defined as loss in welfare due to information asymmetries and moral hazard behavior. Van Osnabrugge (2000) discusses the problem of the agency costs that business angels (principals) need to incur in their investment activity with target firms (agents), pointing out how the former try to settle related conflicts. Looking at the due diligence conducted before the investment is made, the study reveals that business angels are less specialized in target firms’ industries, do not conduct enough independent and on-site researches, have shorter screening processes. On the contrary, business angels are more involved in ex post monitoring activity. More specifically, the closer the target business to the angel’s expertise, the more efficient the angel’s post-monitoring action.

Based on Van Osnabrugge (2000)’s empirical evidence, we hypothesize that a cross-border expansion planned by an entrepreneurial firm may lead to investment monitoring problems, discouraging the inclination of small-sized informal investors to participate in ventures characterized by high principal-agent conflicts. We expect that the involvement of business angels in such deals would increase with the co-presence of venture capitalists, whose screening and monitoring capacity can rely on a stronger organizational infrastructure. In line with the latter studies, we expect the following:

H3: Firms in need of expanding their cross-border operations are less likely to receive equity financing from business angels compared to those engaged in increasing the scale of their operations.

Mason and Harrison (2004) show that investments in technology ventures have highly skewed returns leading to lower marginal losses than those associated with investments in non-technological ventures. Additional risks (compared to those in non-tech firms) are compensated by a more efficient deal screening process and more active post-investment monitoring activity.

The business angels’ community is also becoming more sophisticated and specialized, revealing an increasing interest for investments in the healthcare sector (EBAN, 2017). In 2017 in the US market, a 30% of angel funding has been devoted to ICT, 20% to healthcare and medical devices and equipment, with the remaining being shared between retail services, business services, energy and utilities (Sohl, 2018). Based on the above, we test the following hypothesis:

H4: Business angels are more likely to target investments into entrepreneurial firms operating in the ICT industry rather than in less sophisticated sectors, which requires high level of prior technical expertise.

While there is wide evidence that North America is the primary target geographic region of business angels, with US being the principal target country given the leading role played by the former in stimulating the growth of the high-tech sector, the Asian market is becoming more and more attractive for informal investors, especially in the eRetail sector. However, small and medium-sized enterprises operating in Asian-Pacific countries face several constraints, such as the presence of information asymmetries between banks and new ventures which makes the lending activity more difficult, their incapacity to manage effectively the working capital, the embryonal state of the market that makes difficult to catch growth opportunities. For all these reasons, it is a challenge for business angels not only to provide funds to such ventures, but also knowledge and expertise, so as to foster their need

for improved entrepreneurial initiatives (Abe, Troilo and Batsaikhan, 2015). Therefore, we ask:

H5: Business angels are more likely to primarily invest into entrepreneurial firms operating in developed countries (North America, Europe) rather than in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. Literature Review

Edelman, Manolova & Brush (2017) and Wallmeroth, Wirtz, & Groh (2018) provided detailed literature reviews about angel investing.

On BAs' capability of obtaining returns, individually or by groups (business networks) one can see Mason & Harrison (1996, 2002); Paul, Whittam & Wyper (2007); Knyphausen-Aufseß & Westphal (2008); Le Merle M. & L. (2015); Capizzi (2015); Croce, Tenca & Ughetto (2017); Bonini, Capizzi, Valletta & Zocchi (2018).

To inquiry into our question research (what are the factors that most attract business angels' investments?) we searched for studies dealing with the hypotheses we want to test:

To this purpose, an interesting study is that of Aernoudt (2005), who identifies and analyzes seven ways to stimulate BAs' investments, represented by (the list):

1. Syndication (a large number of business angels working together);
2. Co-investment schemes (public money added to private investments);
3. Investment readiness (availability of BAs in advising entrepreneurs about business plans and external equity finance);
4. Corporate orientation (start-ups and SMEs need BAs management skills);
5. Business angel academy (understanding of the investment process);
6. Business angel networks (a platform where SMEs and BAs can make contact);
7. Integrated finance approach (to reduce the cost of finance for SMEs).

The mentioned ways are completely different from our hypotheses.

The BAs investment decisions are also well studied by the IBAN Survey 2017. The main factors considered for the business assessment are: the expected market growth, with a weight of 27%; the management team (weight of 24%); the ethical company attitude (19%); the product characteristics (11%); the possibility to become a company manager (8%); the industrial sector (5%).

These characteristics are interesting, but they differ from our hypotheses and they are specifically referred to the Italian market.

Others interesting studies about our first and third hypothesis⁴ are that of Benjamin & Margulis (2001) and Ramadani (2009). BAs provide to small and medium-sized enterprises more than money. They are hands-on investors and contribute with skills, expertise, knowledge, and contacts in the businesses they invest in. For these reasons the work of Ramadani can also refer for our hypothesis number four (market type and business expertise). Benjamin & Margulis, on the contrary, offer an angel investor's handbook, looking to the kind of enterprises capturing the interest of BAs: early-stage or start-ups.

The second hypothesis is well discussed by Wetzel (1987), who analyzes two aspects of the informal venture capital market: questions of scale and market efficiency.

Particularly abundant is the existing literature about the hypothesis four. Lalkaka (2002) evaluates the use of BAs for the innovation-based economy; Lindsay (2004), even if he does not offer a detail about the economic segments of investment, analyzes the relationship between the entrepreneurial firms and BAs; Mason & Harrison (2004), Harbi, Amamou & Anderson (2009) evaluate the BAs investments in technology (and high tech)-based firms.

⁴ The hypothesis three strengthens the hypothesis one.

Finally, the hypothesis five is focused on the geographical location of BAs investments. Most studies exclusively look at specific geographical areas or time horizons. This is the case of Amorós, Atienza & Romani (2008), who study the activity in Chile; Colombo & Murtinu (2016), Croce, D'Adda & Ughetto (2015), focused on Europe; Mason & Harrison (2000a, 2000b, 2015) and Van Osnabrugge (2000), who analyze the UK market; Gullander & Napier (2003), who study the Nordic countries; Maula, Autio & Arenius (2005), focused on Finland; Prowse (1998), Shane (2005) and Sohl (2003 and 2018), referring to the American reality; Sudek (2006) for South California; Bachher & Guild (1996), Maxwell, Jeffrey & Lévesque (2011) for the Canadian reality. The focus on specific geographical areas is also evident in some of the already mentioned articles: Lalkaka proposes some examples from USA, China, Brazil and India; Lindsay is focused on Australia; Harbi, Amamou & Anderson study the Tunisian market.

Given the above, hypothesis five refers to a specific market: Asia. To this proposal we mention the work of Harrison (2017), for which the BAs activity grows in prominence of emerging markets, with possibility of internationalization; Scheela & Isidro (2009), who study the impact of BAs in the Southeast Asian emerging economies (Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam). The same themes are developed in detail by Scheela & Jittrapanun (2012) for Thailand; Scheela & Isidro (2008) for Philippines; Li, Jiang, Long, Tang & Wu (2014) for China offering an international comparison with USA, UK, Japan, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand; Tashiro (1999) for Japan compared with North America and West Europe counterparts.

In our opinion, the cited studies have at least two negative gaps: the excessive focus on a single geographical area and the methodology. Most of them are realized by simple interviews. This is the case of Li, Jiang, Long, Tang & Wu, who use a questionnaire survey; of Mason & Stark (2004), whose results come from verbal protocols on three bankers, three venture capitalists and four BAs; of Lindsay, where the panel is composed by 87 BAs responding to a questionnaire by phone. Data arising from simple interviews may be distorted or not representative.

On the contrary, our study spans 3 years (2016-2018) using a dataset of 2,353 deals. BAs account for a total of 384 deals, with a participation of more than 16.32 percent. Moreover, our dataset is international. Data come from two databases (MarketLine Advantage and Zephyr). They do not depend on interviews and they do not to discriminate among geographical areas.

4. Empirical Analysis

4.1 Dataset description

The construction of the dataset relies on the combined use of three databases: MarketLine Advantage, CrunchBase and Zephyr. We have collected a preliminary sample of 2353 venture financing deals completed worldwide in the early-stage financing industry (seed capital, accelerators, business angels, VC) in the 2016-2018 period using MarketLine Advantage as a primary source. All of 2353 deals may involve the participation of a venture capitalist (or a group of venture capitalists) alone or a business angel (or a group of business angels) alone or, alternatively, the co-presence of a business angel and a VC (co-investment). We then extracted only those deals carried out by business angels as sole or co-investors (with VCs) leading to a final sample of 384 transactions. To detect the presence of angels in deals where their participation was not clear or undisclosed, we used CrunchBase as a secondary source of data with the aim of integrating MarketLine Advantage. Zephyr was utilized to replace missing data on deal values. Our final sample was composed by 384 angel financing deals completed worldwide in the 3-year, 2016-2018 period amounting to 16,32% of venture finance transactions under investigation.

The financing activity of business angels is associated with three sequential stages of the new venture

life-cycle: seed, start-up, expansion. Accordingly, the sample is divided into such three investment sub-categories: angels are involved in 158 seed financing deals (41%), 30 start-up financing deals (8%) and 196 expansion financing deals (51%) (Figure 1). Seemingly, expansion is the predominant stage-related form of investment for business angels. However, the phenomenon of angel financing can be better understood if investment categories are investigated by comparing angels' involvement at various stages to that of VCs over the same period. Figure 2 shows that business angels tend to invest 21,67% more in seed capital than VCs, 48,57% more in start-up financing than VCs, and 89,01% less in expansion capital than VCs. Indeed, expansion financing only accounts for 9,17% of deal-making conducted by business angels over the 3-year period considered (2016-2018), while seed and start-up financing activities prevail (87,8% and 85,71% respectively). Such evidence corroborates the role played by angels as equity capital providers in the very early stages of a new enterprise's life-cycle.

The size of investment preferred by business angels is rather modest (below \$ 4 million). Figure 3 shows that only 75 transactions (where angels co-invest with a VC) exceed \$ 4 million (reaching a maximum value of \$ 16 million) with the majority of them being below such a threshold. Deal values are significantly lower, if only those transactions with angels being the sole investors without the involvement of VCs are considered, suggesting that VCs may serve as anchor investors lowering the degree of angels' risk aversion with an increase in their deal-size setting (Figure 4). Contrarily, when angels are the first providers of funds to entrepreneurs under no risk-sharing, the size of deal-making is significantly lower.

The rationale driving angel deal-making is threefold: finance growth (92,71%), cross-border expansion (4,95%), increase scale (2,34%) (Figure 5). Deals included in our sample span 9 different industries, suggesting a high degree of heterogeneity in angels' target sector setting, with ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) being the first choice (239 deals; 62%) followed by pharmaceutical and healthcare (52 deals; 14%) (Figure 6). Investments in both ICT and pharma require high levels of prior technical knowledge and expertise as well as experience to assess the innovativeness of the value proposition proposed by new entrepreneurial ventures. Business angels are also highly attracted by market digitalization, which drives their investment activities towards eRetail (17 deals; 4%) and media (17 deals; 4%).

Our sample includes angel financing deals completed around the globe spanning five geographical regions (North America, South Central America, Europe, Middle East and Africa, Asia-Pacific). Deals carried out in North America prevail (189 deals; 49%) followed by those concentrated in the Asia Pacific area (102; 27%) and Europe (75; 20%) (Figure 7).

4.2 Econometric model

To empirically test the above hypotheses, we run a binary logistic regression (logit) on the sample of 2353 observations representing early-stage venture financing deals completed worldwide in the 2016-2018 period. As indicated, these transactions may have been carried out solely by VCs or angels, or, alternatively, by both through a form of co-investment. The aim of our empirical analysis is to investigate the characteristics of angel financing compared to those of VC investment activity. For this purpose, we define a dichotomous variable (*Angel*) taking the value of 1 if a business angel deal occurs on a stand-alone basis or jointly with a VC acting as an anchor investor and 0 otherwise, that is when the VC performs the transaction as a sole investor. Such a dichotomous variable becomes the dependent variable of our econometric model. A set of 11 independent variables is chosen. The first independent regressor is the value (\$ amount) of each deal (computed as a logarithm) (*Value*). Two further independent variables include dummies accounting for the stages of the new venture life-cycle at which equity financing is provided (*Seed*, *Start-up*). The rationale type of angel vs. VC deal-making is accounted for through the inclusion of two dummies taking the value of 1 if the target firm is willing to finance the expansion of its cross-border operations (and 0 otherwise) (*CrossBorder*) and if the target firm is willing to finance its operations' scale increase (and 0 otherwise) (*Increase Scale*). The

specification of our econometric model is completed by industry dummies (*ICT, Pharma, eRetail*) and geographic dummies (*Europe, North America, AsiaPacific*). Definition and source of all variables are summarized in Table 1.

[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The results of our analysis (with estimates of coefficients shown in the first column and p-values shown in the last column) are presented in Table 2.

Our logit model obtains an adjusted R-squared of 41.9% and a R-squared of McFadden of 43.0%.

[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

4.3 Discussion of findings

Our empirical analysis shows a statistically significant ($p \leq 0.001$) inverse relationship between the involvement of a business angels and the size of the investment deal (*Value*). Moreover, we give an estimation of such a probability for three possible scenarios:

- a business angel has a probability of 0.842% of financing a business whose investment deal has a size of about \$ 65 million;
- a business angel has a probability of about 33% of financing a venture when the deal size reaches \$ 2 million;
- a business angel has a probability of 90.5% of financing a venture with a deal size of \$ 0.16 million.

Hence, H1 is empirically validated.

Furthermore, we find out that business angels are primarily seed and start-up investors. The coefficients associated with both variables, *Seed* and *StartUp*, are strongly significant at statistical level and positive. Our evidence confirms H2.

Our empirical analysis also reveals that there exist an inverse relationship between angel financing and cross-border expansion plans of target firms. The coefficient associated with the variable *CrossBorder* is negative and highly statistically significant. The rationale type of deal-making preferred by business angels (compared to that of VCs) is the financing of increase-scale operations of target firms. This is in line with the sign of the coefficient associated with the variable *IncreaseScale*, despite its statistical insignificance. H3 is partially confirmed.

Industry orientation of angel financing - empirically tested with the sector dummies *ICT, Pharma*, and *eRetail* – is not clear as all coefficients associated with these three variables show a positive sign but are not statistically significant. Hence, H4 is not empirically validated.

Finally, our regression analysis suggests that the investment activity of business angels is less likely to be oriented towards entrepreneurial ventures operating in most developed regions, such as *Europe* and *North America*, as the related coefficients have a negative sign and are statistically significant at 10% level. Instead, *AsiaPacific* is a more attractive region for angel investing, as shown by the positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with such a dummy variable. Hence, based on our empirical evidence, H5 is rejected.

5. Conclusions

We conclude that business angels are small-sized deal-makers positioned to invest into the very early

stages of a new venture life-cycle (seed, start-up), less oriented towards ventures in need of financing the expansion of their cross-border operations and increasingly attracted by target firms operating in the Asia Pacific region rather than in developed countries such as US or those of the continental Europe.

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Figure 1 – Angel Financing Deals by Stage of the New Venture Life-Cycle




Figure 2 – Angel Financing vs VC Deal-Making by Stage of the New Venture Life-Cycle




Figure 3 – Size of Angel Deal-Making




Figure 4 – Size of Angel Deal-Making (under no co-investment with a VC)




Figure 5 – Rationale Types of Angel Financing




Figure 6 – Angel Financing Deals by Industries




Figure 7 – Angel Financing Deals by Geographic Regions




Table 1 – Variables’ Description

Variable	Definition	Source
Angel	Dichotomous variable: 1 if the deal-maker is a business angel, 0 if the deal-maker is a venture capitalist	<i>MarketLine Advantage; CrunchBase</i>
Value	Logarithm of the value of the angel financing deal	<i>MarketLine Advantage; Zephyr</i>
Seed	Dummy: 1 if the business angel invests in seed stage ventures, 0 otherwise	<i>MarketLine Advantage</i>
StartUp	Dummy: 1 if the business angel invests in start-up phase ventures, 0 otherwise	<i>MarketLine Advantage</i>
CrossBorder	Dummy: 1 if the business angel finances a cross-border expansion project, 0 otherwise	<i>MarketLine Advantage</i>
IncreaseScale	Dummy: 1 if the business angel finances an increase-scale project, 0 otherwise	<i>MarketLine Advantage</i>
ICT	Dummy: 1 if the business angel invests in ICT ventures, 0 otherwise	<i>MarketLine Advantage</i>
Pharma	Dummy: 1 if the business angel invests in pharmaceutical and healthcare ventures, 0 otherwise	<i>MarketLine Advantage</i>
eRetail	Dummy: 1 if the business angel invests in ventures whose core business is eRetail, 0 otherwise	<i>MarketLine Advantage</i>
Europe	Dummy: 1 if the target region of the business angel is Europe, 0 otherwise	<i>MarketLine Advantage</i>
NorthAmerica	Dummy: 1 if the target region of the business angel is North America, 0 otherwise	<i>MarketLine Advantage</i>
AsiaPacific	Dummy: 1 if the target region of the business angel is Asia-Pacific, 0 otherwise	<i>MarketLine Advantage</i>

Table 2 – Logistic Regression

Modello : Logit, usando le osservazioni 1-2353					
Variabile dipendente: Angel					
Errori standard basati sull'Hessiana					
	coefficiente	errore std.	z	p-value	
	-----	-----	-----	-----	
	const	16,2856	1,37384	11,85	2,05e-032 ***
H ₁ ←	Value	-1,16968	0,0865241	-13,52	1,22e-041 ***
H ₂ ←	Seed	2,87303	0,267907	10,72	7,86e-027 ***
	StartUp	2,82968	0,605509	4,673	2,97e-06 ***
H ₃ ←	CrossBorder	-1,68930	0,471032	-3,586	0,0003 ***
	IncreaseScale	0,650063	0,575376	1,130	0,2586
	ICT	0,175161	0,197555	0,8866	0,3753
H ₄ ←	Pharma	0,115073	0,299014	0,3848	0,7004
	eRetail	0,222768	0,420588	0,5297	0,5963
	Europe	-0,633287	0,351999	-1,799	0,0720 *
H ₅ ←	NorthAmerica	-0,587830	0,325585	-1,805	0,0710 *
	AsiaPacific	0,604901	0,359591	-1,682	0,0925 *

Deal Category

Rational Type

Deal Industry

Target Region